In this paper, we quantify the contribution of labour market reforms to unemployment dynamics in nine OECD countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). We build and estimate a dynamic stochastic search-matching model with heterogeneous workers, where aggregate shocks to productivity fuel up the cycle, and unanticipated policy interventions displace the stationary stochastic equilibrium by shifting structural turnover parameters. We show that the heterogeneous-worker mechanism proposed by Robin (2011) to explain unemployment volatility by productivity shocks works well in all countries.
Introduction
A large number of economic studies have been devoted to the question of how labour markets respond to economic policy in changing local and international macroeconomic environments.
Studies comparing European and American labour markets usually try to nd the source of long-term European unemployment in dierent labour market institutions. Beginning with Bruno and Sachs (1985) , economic research initially consisted in running pooled cross-section and time-series regressions of unemployment on various macroeconomic indicators (like GDP growth) and many labour market institutional indices for a large number of OECD countries (see Layard and Nickell, 1999 , for a survey).
This approach culminated in the work of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola, Blau and Khan (2007) who showed that dierent policy mixes induce dierent responses of unemployment to world-wide shocks (like an oil shock) and country-specic productivity shocks, while Bassanini and Duval (2009) examine and demonstrate the existence of complementarity eects between labour market policies. In parallel, in order to understand the mechanisms of these interactions, an active research area spawned a collection of small dynamic stochastic equilibrium models focussing on one particular labour market policy at a time. For example, the inuential work of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) emphasizes the link between long-term unemployment and welfare policies, while Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2008) highlight the role of labour taxes.
In this paper we follow a medium way. We will try to incorporate the rich reduced forms of the former approach into a small equilibrium model of the latter kind. The idea is to identify a small set of parameters of the dynamic equilibrium model governing the response to aggregate shocks of unemployment and turnover, and channelling a wide range of labour market policies at the same time. The number of involved institutions may be large but the number of parameters through which they impact the economy should be kept small. The intuition behind this assertion is that this number should not be larger than the number of independent series used in the analysis. Specically, if we use series of unemployment stocks and ows and vacancies as labour market variables, we argue that it will be dicult to identify more than three separate channels for policy intervention. 1 The model considered in this paper is a dynamic stochastic search-matching model with heterogeneous workers, where aggregate shocks to productivity fuel up the cycle, and unanticipated policy interventions displace the stationary stochastic equilibrium by shifting structural turnover parameters. It is estimated for 9 dierent countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) over the period . The estimation procedure is in two steps: First, a version without policy interventions is estimated on detrended series by a Simulated Method of Moments. Aggregate shocks are ltered out by minimising the sum of squared dierences between actual and simulated aggregate output series. Second, policy eects are introduced and estimated by minimising the sum of squared residual errors for the series of the actual unemployment rate (i.e. trend plus cycle), its turnover components and job vacancies.
Our model belongs to the search-matching tradition (Pissarides, 1990 and all workers are thus employable. In bad states, low-skill workers fail to generate positive surplus and are thus laid o or stay unemployed longer. With a thick left tail of the ability distribution, small adverse aggregate shocks to the economy lead to a disproportionately high number of low-skill workers into the negative surplus region and into unemployment. We show that this amplication mechanism ts unemployment volatility well in all nine major OECD countries used in the empirical analysis.
Second dierence with respect to the MP model, following Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) , we assume that wage contracts are long term contracts that are renegotiated by mutual agreement only. Wage renegotiation is either induced by on-the-job search and Bertrand competition between employers, or by aggregate shocks big enough to threaten match disruption. As a consequence, wages in new jobs are more volatile than ongoing wagesan empirical fact that was recently emphasized by Pissarides (2009) , which he viewed as a reason for not believing in the sticky-wage explanation for large unemployment volatility. Finally, our model is used to assess the impact of labour market reforms on the actual (not detrended) rate of unemployment. To this end, we simulate the reaction of steadystate unemployment to changes in policy settings. We nd a large unemployment eect of reforms involving active labour market policies -especially those aecting the amount of resources devoted to placement and employment services and to training -and product market regulation. Reforms aiming at shifting the replacement rate of unemployment benets, the volume of public resources devoted to employment incentives, the degree of employment protection and the tax wedge display negligible unemployment eects, either because they rely on relatively lower elasticities, or because within-country changes in these LMPs have been relatively smaller in the past (due for instance to dierences in political feasibility).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a dynamic sequential-auction model with heterogeneous workers and identical rms is developed. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 the estimation procedure. In Section 5, the model is estimated to account for cyclical unemployment in six OECD countries. In Section 6, labour market policy eects are estimated using the actual, observed, quarterly series of the rate of unemployment for each of the nine OECD countries. Section 7 examines transitory short-term dynamics. The last section concludes. 4 
The model
The model extends Robin's (2011) by endogenising labour demand through a matching function and vacancy creation. We here proceed to a brief description.
Timing, aggregate shocks and individual heterogeneity
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ N. The global state of the economy is an ergodic Markov chain y t ∈ {y 1 < ... < y N } with transition matrix Π = (π ij ). We use y t to denote the random variable and y i or y j to denote one of the N possible realisations. There are M types of workers and m workers of each type, with 1 + ... + M = 1. Workers of type m have ability x m and x m < x m+1 . All rms are identical. Workers and rm are paired into productive units. The per-period output of a worker of ability x m when aggregate productivity is y i is denoted as y i (m).
We let S t (m) denote the surplus of a match with a worker of type x m at time t, that is, the present value of the match minus the value of unemployment and minus the value of a vacancy (assumed to be nil). Only matches with positive surplus S t (m) ≥ 0 are viable.
Turnover and unemployment
Matches form and break at the beginning of each period. Let u t (m) denote the proportion of unemployed in the population of workers of ability x m at the end of period t − 1, or at the beginning of period t, just before revelation of the aggregate shock for period t, and let u t = u t (1) 1 + ... + u t (M ) M dene the aggregate unemployment rate.
At the moment when y t is realised, a fraction 1{S t (m) < 0}[1 − u t (m)] m of employed workers is endogenously laid o because the match surplus becomes negative, and another fraction δ1{S t (m) ≥ 0}[1 − u t (m)] m is exogenously destroyed. In addition, a fraction λ t 1{S t (m) ≥ 0}u t (m) m of employable unemployed workers meet with a vacancy. Finally, we also allow employees to meet with alternative employers, and move or negotiate wage increases (more on this later).
Aggregate shocks thus determine unemployment by conditioning job destruction and the duration of unemployment. The law of motion for individual-specic unemployment rates is
The dynamics of unemployment by worker type depends on the dynamics of the whole match surplis, not on how the surplus is split between the employer and the worker.
Dene the exit rate from unemployment (or job nding rate) as the product of the meeting rate and the share of employable unemployed workers,
Dene the job destruction rate as the sum of the exogenous and the endogenous layo rates,
Aggregate unemployment then satises the usual recursion:
It is important to stress here that both the job nding rate f t and the job destruction rate 
Rent sharing
We assume that employers have full monopsony power with respect to unemployed workers.
They keep the whole surplus in this case and unemployed workers leave unemployment with a wage that is only marginally greater than their reservation wage.
Employed workers search on the job. When they meet an employed worker, we assume that Bertrand competition between the two identical rms transfers the entire surplus to the worker, leaving nothing to employers, whether incumbent or poacher.
Note that we could easily allow for Nash bargaining between unemployed workers and rms. Bertrand competition between incumbent and poacher is the main simplifying assumption.
Vacancy creation and market tightness
Firms posts vacancies v t until ex ante prots are exhausted. The total vacancy cost is cv t . Vacancies can either meet with an unemployed worker or with an employed worker.
However, only the meetings with unemployed workers generate a rent to the rm. Free entry then ensures that
where we denote x + = max(x, 0).
Dene market tightness as the ratio of vacancies and workers' aggregate search intensity:
where k is the relative search intensity of employees with respect to unemployed. 4 The meeting rate λ t is related to market tightness via the meeting function:
is an increasing function.
The value of unemployment and the match surplus
Let U i (m) denote the present value of remaining unemployed for the rest of period t for a worker of type m if the economy is in state i. It solves the following linear Bellman equation:
This equation is understood as follows. An unemployed worker receives a ow-payment z i (m) for the period. At the beginning of the next period, the state of the economy changes to y j with probability π ij and the worker receives a job oer with some probability. We assume that employers oer unemployed workers their reservation wage on a take-it-or-leave basis, thus taking the whole surplus. As a consequence, the present value of a new job to the worker is only marginally better than the value of unemployment. Hence, the continuation value is the value of unemployment in the new state j whether the workers stays unemployed or not.
Let us now turn to the surplus value. After a productivity shock from i to j all matches yielding negative surplus are destroyed. Then, either on-the-job search delivers no bite, and the match surplus only changes because the macroeconomic environment changes; or the worker is poached and Bertrand competition gives the whole match surplus to the worker, whether she moves or not. As everything that the worker and the rm expect to earn in the future contributes to the denition of the current surplus, the surplus of a match with a worker of type m when the economy is in state i thus solves the following (almost linear) Bellman equation:
This almost-linear system of equations can be solved numerically by value function iteration.
As for the unemployment value, the match surplus only depends on the state of the economy.
Steady-state equilibrium
If the economy stays in state i for ever,
• the equilibrium unemployment rate for group m is
• the aggregate unemployment rate is
is the number of employable workers;
• the free entry condition takes the following form: 
Parametrisation and functional forms
This section describes the functional forms that will be used in the estimation.
Unemployment exit rate and the matching function. The meeting rate, and hence the unemployment exit rate, are related to market tightness θ t via a Cobb-Douglas matching technology:
A standard cross-country OLS regression (which would abstract from employability of the unemployed and confound the meeting rate with the exit rate, and would additionally dene Aggregate shocks. We assume that aggregate log-productivity follows a Gaussian AR (1) process:
where innovations are iid-normal N (0, 1). This simple specication happened to yield a very good t of total output.
Note that the aggregate productivity shock y t is a latent process that does not a priori coincide with observed output or output per worker. Indeed, observed output is the aggregation of match output y t (m) across all active matches, say
and is thus endogenous. Therefore, the structural parameters (ρ, σ) cannot be directly inferred from the observed series of cyclical output per person.
We discretise the aggregate productivity process y t as follows. Let F denote the estimated equilibrium distribution of y t . 5 The joint distribution of two consecutive ranks F (y t ) and
F (y t+1 ) is a copula C (i.e. the cdf of the distribution of two random variables with uniform margins). To discretise the aggregate productivity processes we rst specify a grid a 1 < ... < a N on [ , 1 − ] ⊂ (0, 1) of N linearly spaced points including end points and 1 − . Then we set y i = F −1 (a i ) and π ij ∝ c(a i ; a j ), where c denotes the copula density and we impose the normalisation j π ij = 1. In practice, we use N = 150, = 0, 002; F is a log-normal CDF and c is a Gaussian copula density, as implied by the Gaussian AR(1) specication.
Worker heterogeneity. Match productivity is specied as
The choice of the support does not matter much provided that it is large enough and contains one. A beta distribution is assumed for the ability distribution, namely
with the normalisation m m = 1. The beta distribution allows for a variety of shapes for the density (increasing, decreasing, non monotone, concave or convex). We use a very dense grid of M = 500 points to guarantee a good resolution in the left tail.
Leisure and vacancy costs. The opportunity cost of employment z i (m) (aggregating the utility of leisure, unemployment insurance and welfare) is specied as a constant z 0 .
Labour market institutions. Because of the feed-back eects implied by the model, it is important for identication that we restrict the channels of policy interventions. For example, any policy that directly impacts matching eciency (φ) immediately changes the meeting rate (λ t ) and, subsequently, the number of created vacancies (v t ) via the free entry condition. Both eects contribute to change the job nding rate (f t ). If one makes the 5 That is, with white-noise innovations, ln y t ∼ N 0, σ 2
cost of posting a vacancy (c) another intervention channel for this policy, there will be a concurrent way for this policy to change vacancies, and one obviously reduces the chances that the model be identied.
Because we only have independent data information on turnover ows (f t and s t ) and vacancies (v t ) we decide to introduce labour market policies (henceforth LMPs) through only three structural parameters, which look like the most direct intervention channels for f t , s t and v t : matching eciency, φ (via equation (1)), the job destruction rate, δ (equation (2)), and the cost of posting a vacancy, c (equation (3)).
Formally, we let parameters φ, δ and c in country n at time t be log-linear indices of country-specic institutional variables X 1 nt , ..., X K nt . Specically,
In the above equations, the LMP semi-elasticities (φ k , δ k , c k ) are common to all countries.
However, intercepts (φ 0 n , δ 0 n , c 0 n ) are country-specic. This framework thus identies institutional eects from policy change.
For each parameter, we further impose exclusion restrictions based on economic reasoning and available empirical evidence. The exact conditioning structure will be detailed in the next section after listing the policy variables contained in the data.
The data
This section describes the data assembled for nine OECD countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Unites States). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the rate of unemployment as well as the probability of entering and exiting unemployment. All series are quarterly. These variables come from a collection of data sources that are described in detail in the companion appendix (Appendix A). The trend and cyclical components were extracted by HP-ltering with a smoothing parameter equal to 10 5 , as in Shimer (2005).
Unemployment and turnover cycle
The volatility of unemployment and turnover are very dierent across countries. Japan displays lower and less volatile unemployment, due to lower job destruction rates, than any other country. The US exhibit more turnover and higher exit rates from unemployment.
France, and Japan to a lesser extent, display particularly low cyclical volatility in unemployment turnover.
Interesting patterns emerge from trends ( Long-term unemployment trends hide strikingly dierent trends in turnover rates. Job destruction rates tend to increase in France, Japan, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and to decrease in Australia, the UK and the US since the mid-1980s. Job-nding rates tend to increase in Australia, France and Spain, and to decrease in Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US.
These patterns are potentially associated with important labour market reforms that we now briey discuss.
Labour market policies
The set of labour market policy variables (LMPs) used as potential determinants of unemployment stocks and ows in the empirical analysis are the following: 6 i) the replacement rate used to calculate unemployment benets at rst date of reception; ii) public expenditure 6 Other institutions have been empirically tested, such as the minimum wage and some characteristics of the wage bargaining process, and proved to be non-signicant in most cases. intervention. Hence, by drastically restricting the number of channels, we provide a lower bound on the eects of labour market policy reforms. Heuristically, we ended up restricting the mapping between LMPs and structural parameters as follows.
Unemployment subsidisation potentially has a structural eect on turnover through matching eciency (parameter φ) as it determines the job search intensity of unemployed workers: more generous unemployment benets lower job search intensity. A higher volume of placement and employment services would have the opposite eect and improve job search intensity and matching eciency, and in addition, they may improve the job match quality. They are allowed to have an impact on parameters φ and δ. Whereas more training provided to unemployed workers is supposed to raise the quality of the match and hence to lower parameter δ, its impact on matching eciency through parameter φ is ambiguous as participation to the training programme may also delay the exit out of unemployment.
Employment incentives subsidise vacancy creation, yielding a lower c and sustaining weaker job matches that terminate more often (higher δ). 
Estimation procedure
The estimation is in two steps. A restricted version of the model with time-constant structural parameters is rst estimated to t the cycle components of the series. This rst stage is useful, in particular, to lter out the series of aggregate shocks y t driving the business cycle.
In a second step, the structural parameters of the policy variables governing unemployment turnover rates are estimated so as to t the trends. This estimation procedure is considerably easier to implement than any other method, Bayesian or frequentist, for nonlinear state-space models.
First step: business-cycle (BC) parameters
The estimation of the parameters of the model controlling for the short-term response of the economy to business cycle shocks closely follows the method in Robin (2011) . In this rst-stage estimation, we assume that HP-ltered series follow the model of this paper as in a stationary environment (but not xed) exempt from any institutional change. Hence, we impose φ k = δ k = c k = 0 to each policy variable (k ≥ 1) and each country. Ten parameters remain to be estimated: the country-specic vacancy creation cost c 0 , the exogenous layo rate δ 0 , the two parameters of the matching function (φ 0 , η), the leisure cost parameter z 0 , the three parameters of the distribution of worker heterogeneity (C , µ, ν), and the two parameters of the latent productivity process (ρ, σ). The number of aggregate states is set to N = 150, the number of dierent ability types is taken equal to M = 500.
The BC parameters θ BC = (c 0 , δ 0 , φ 0 , η, z 0 , C, µ, ν, ρ, σ) are estimated using the Simulated Method of Moments, separately, country by country. In practice, we simulate very long series (T = 5000 observations) of aggregate output, unemployment rates, unemployment turnover and vacancies, and we search for the set of parameters θ BC that best matches the following 18 country-specic moments: i) the mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation of log GDP;
ii) the mean, standard deviation and kurtosis of unemployment; 9 iii) the mean and standard deviation of unemployment entry and exit rates and of market tightness; iv) four elasticities with respect to output: log unemployment, its turnover rates and market tightness regressed on log output; v) two other elasticities: log job-nding rate regressed on log market tightness, and log job nding rate regressed on log unemployment rate.
Once these structural parameters have been estimated, we lter out the series of aggregate shocks y t so as to minimise the sum of squared residuals for log GDP.
Second step: policy eects
In the second step, we take the series of aggregate shocks y t as given, and we estimate the policy parameters θ P = (φ k , δ k , k = 1, .. The economy is simulated assuming myopic expectations on policy interventions. Whenever a policy variable X k is changed, which only happens infrequently, we recalculate the values of unemployment and of match surplus for all aggregate states, together with the values of job nding and job destruction rate, and keep them set to these levels until the next policy intervention.
We calculate standard errors for the estimates of LMPs parameters θ P as follows. Rather than estimating the Jacobian matrix and using the sandwich formula, which is numerically 9 Matching the kurtosis of time-series observations forces the simulated series to be smooth. cumbersome and not much reliable given the amount of numerical simulations involved, we instead note that equation (1) implies that
So we calculate standard errors for the parameters φ k using the standard OLS formula when regressing the simulated left-hand side component on LMPs. This calculation may severely overestimate the precision of the estimation by neglecting the estimation errors induced by using the parameter estimates instead of the true values to calculate the left hand side. But it nevertheless provides a good indication of how much the simulated series are changed by a small change in the policy parameters at the estimated values. We use a similar approach for the other policy parameters based on equations (2) and (3). 5 The dynamics of cyclical unemployment
Parameter estimates
The results of the rst-stage estimation are reported in Table ? ? Note that the elasticity of the matching function was arbitrarily xed to 0.5 in all countrylevel estimations. Indeed, we could t all moments well for any preset value of η. We explain this lack of identication as follows. The duration of unemployment is controlled by three components: matching eciency (φ), the meeting elasticity with respect to market tightness (η) and worker employability (the sign of the match surplus). It seems that the latter two components are not separately identied. If one increases meeting frequency as a function of the number of created vacancies (η), one can cancel that eect by recalibrating the fraction Table 4 shows how the model ts the 8 moments used in estimation and Table 5 reports the correlations between actual and simulated HP-ltered series. Figure 2 shows the actual and simulated unemployment cycle. Appendix B contains similar plots for all other series (turnover rates and vacancies).
Fitting the cycle
The t is generally good (at least for such a simple model). In particular, the model has no problem tting both the volatility of output and the volatility of unemployment. The mechanism is simple. In good times, unemployment is low and stable and all separations follow from exogenous shocks. When aggregate productivity falls, low-skilled workers start losing their jobs because their match surplus becomes negative. The thicker the left tail of the distribution of worker heterogeneity, the stronger the amplication of productivity shocks into unemployment shocks. Note that worker employability also determines the duration of unemployment. So, after a positive productivity shock, a fraction of previously unproductive workers becomes productive, and in absence of any additional friction such as human capital depreciation while unemployed, heterogeneous ability also works as an amplication mechanism for job creation.
The t of job nding rates is also good, with accurate estimates of volatility. However, the elasticity of job nding rates with respect to tightness (respectively to unemployment) is greatly over-estimated (resp. under-estimated). Although the correlation between actual and predicted series of tightness is good (around 65%), we generally greatly under-estimate its volatility. These two ndings (the excess sensitivity of the job nding rate to market tightness and the under-estimation of the volatility of tightness) are related. The response of vacancy creation to productivity shocks has to be attenuated because of that high elasticity, or job nding rates would not be well tted. Additional friction (such as negative dependence of job nding rates to unemployment duration) is therefore required to make the job nding process more sluggish in recovery times.
Finally, the job destruction rate that is predicted by the model is too unevenly dented, and its correlation to actual series is poor. This may happen again because the process of endogenous job destruction is too lumpy. Following a negative productivity shocks, a mass of workers is instantly laid o, and the job destruction rate is immediately after reverted to the frictional rate of exogenous job destruction unless aggregate productivity keeps going further down.
Nevertheless, we will see in the next section that this apparent failure at tting some aspects of turnover and vacancies may be an artifact of the detrending operation using the Hodrick-Prescott lter. If total output is clearly trended and easily detrended, long-term trends in labour market variables are much more dicult to lter out. This is the reason why Shimer (2005), and his followers, including us, used the HP lter with a smoothing parameter of 10 5 , much greater then the standard value of 1024 usually suggested for quarterly series.
Using 1024 yields a trend of unemployment that undulates like a cycle...In this paper, we would like to argue that a better way of removing trends from labour market variables is to use intervention variables (policy or demographics). As a matter of fact, we shall see in the next section that this lack of t of turnover variables mostly disappears when policy and demographic changes are accounted for. 
Parameter estimates
The estimated policy parameters are reported in Table 6 . For each country, LMP variables were centered around the country-specic mean and standardised by the cross-country and These results bring about some nuances to previous ndings from reduced-form studies.
Like us, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) nd signicant estimates for ALMPs and product market regulation, but unlike our study, they also nd a positive correlation between employment protection and unemployment. On the latter aspect, we are more in line with Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) who argue that employment protection has little eect on the rate of unemployment. The small eect found for the tax wedge can be further explained by the interaction between tax and wage bargaining systems or the minimum wage as underlined by . This issue will be addressed in further work. Finally, the impact of the replacement rate is estimated much lower in other economic studies based on reduced-form regressions. This nding could be explained by the fact that the latter studies mainly capture correlations that are unlikely to fully reect causal eects.
The bottom part of Table 6 reports the estimated eects of education and demographic variables. Educational achievement is found to reduce moderately the pace of job destruction as an additional 0.4-year of higher education (one standard deviation) yields a 4.5% reduction in the job destruction rate.
10 A younger working-age population has a an unexpected negative but small impact on job destruction (which we view as a statistical anomaly), while an older working-age population slightly reduces both job creation through matching eciency and job destruction. to the actual series. Table 7 displays the correlations between actual and simulated series.
Fitting the trends
Actual and simulated unemployment rates are highly correlated for all countries, with an average correlation equal to 0.81. The best t is obtained for Australia, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom with correlations close to or above 0.90, while the model performs less well for the United States with correlations close to 0.5. Incidentally, the LMP model has a slightly better t for actual unemployment than the BC model for cyclical unemployment.
Said dierently, the HP-lter may fail to some extent to remove the structural changes related to policy reforms.
The t of job destruction rates is greatly improved as the correlation between predicted and observed series jumps from 0.20 in the BC model to 0.55 in the LMP model. The t of job nding rates, which are well predicted except for Germany and Portugal, and the US to a lesser extent, has also improved. Market tightness is well tted for all countries but the US and Portugal.
Overall, these results suggest that LMPs help predict the permanent shifts in unemployment and its turnover components in a satisfactory manner. The model is also able to In a second step, we calculate the counterfactual steady-state unemployment rates that result from a one-standard deviation change in the LMP. The standard deviation is the average value of the set of within-country standard deviations. Namely, we consider a 3.2percentage-point reduction of the replacement rate; the volume of per unemployed resources devoted to placement and employment services (respectively training and employment incentives) as a fraction of GDP per worker is increased by 0.011 (resp. 0.015 and 0.020); the OECD index of product market regulation (respectively employment protection of regular contracts) is lowered by 1.11 (resp. 0.16) points; the tax wedge is reduced by 2.6 percentage points. is equal to 8.3%. We also report steady-state values of unemployment turnover rates and the standard deviations of all series. Then, the bottom part of Table 8 reports unemployment changes resulting from individual labour market reforms.
In so far as the size of LMP-changes do represent commensurate and comparable policy reforms, the LMPs most conducive to unemployment reduction appear to be, by decreasing order, placement and employment services (-0.47 percentage points on average), product market regulation (-0.32 percentage points), and to a lesser extent, training (-0.16). The replacement rate, employment incentives, employment protection and the tax wedge display negligible unemployment eects, either because they display lower relative elasticities, or because within-country changes in these LMPs have been relatively smaller in the past (due for instance to dierences in political feasibility). As made evident from At the bottom of Table 8 , we report the sum of individual LMP-eects, as well as the calculated unemployment eect arising from the simultaneous change in all LMPs (labelled as the policy mix"). We do not nd evidence of policy complementarity, as the sum of individual eects is always slightly larger than the impact of the policy mix. This nding contrasts with the one described in Bassanini and Duval (2009) , who nd positive interaction eects assessed on the basis of panel data reduced-form regressions.
Finally, we nd that identical labour market reforms trigger very dierent unemployment changes across countries, with high-unemployment countries such as Spain or France witnessing larger unemployment reductions. This result is partly expected from the multiplicative relationships linking unemployment to its turnover rates, and the latter to LMPs (see equations and 11 to 13). Said dierently, a broadly similar relative decrease in unemployment mechanically yields a larger absolute reduction. Policy mix (all reforms) -1.04 -1.38 -0.83 -0.47 -0.86 -2.00 -0.77 -1.10 -0.81 -1.03
Note: Each LMP is shifted by the same amount across countries with the aim of reducing unemployment. We use the average within-country standard deviation of LMPs as a benchmark for the size of labour market reforms. This corresponds to a decrease in 3.2 percentage points in the replacement rate, an increase by 0.011 (respectively 0.015 and 0.020) in the normalized volume of resources devoted to placement and employment services (resp. training and employment incentives), a decrease in 1.11 (respectively 0.16) points in the OECD index of product market regulation (resp. employment protection for regular contracts), and a 2.6 percentage points increase in the tax wedge.
Conclusion
We have proposed a non-stationary dynamic search-matching model with worker heterogeneous abilities and labour market reforms. Worker heterogeneity interacts with aggregate productivity shocks in a way that allows for endogenous job destruction. It suces that a small fraction of the total workforce be at risk of a shock that renders the match surplus negative to amplify this productivity shock and generate the observed volatility of cyclical unemployment. Moreover, shifts in labour market institutions imply changes in the level of potential unemployment. Within each of the 9 OECD countries, the model displays an impressive t of cyclical and actual unemployment dynamics. The amount of resources injected into placement and employment services as well as the degree of product market regulation stand out as prominent policy levers in view of reducing unemployment. We also nd that the magnitude of the latter eects are larger among high-unemployment countries.
As a nal caveat, it is important to remember that the identication of institutional eects depends on the structure of interaction that the model assumes. While this restriction guarantees a proper identication, it also implies that other models may come up with dierent conclusions as regards the inuence of policy reforms. For instance, hysteresis eect in the form of a decline in job search intensity along the unemployment spell is an important channel through which labour market institutions (such as the maximal duration of unemployment benets) could creep in. Hysteresis could further be regarded as a complementary source of amplication of business cycle shocks to the labour market, as it potentially increases unemployment turnover sluggishness. So our simple model could be enriched to capture more complex relationships between the business cycle, labour market institutions and labour market outcomes. We raise that possibility in view of future investigation.
